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INTRODUCTION

Opioid litigation began around the turn of the century and mostly
involved unsuccessful lawsuits by addicts against the manufacturers of
prescription opioids.' The landscape began to change several years ago when
a number of state and local governments filed lawsuits against opioid drug
manufacturers, seeking damages and other relief for the social and economic
consequences of widespread opioid addiction in their territory.2 Since then,
hundreds of government entities (hereinafter referred to as "government
plaintiffs") have sued the manufacturers, distributors, prescribers, retail
sellers, corporate officers and physician promoters of opioid products
(hereinafter referred to as "defendants"). When I began working on this
Article in the fall of 2017, I expected that the opioid cases would resemble the
government lawsuits of the 1990s against the firearms and lead-based
industry. Consequently, my research focused on the strength of the liability
theories and defenses that the parties would invoke as these cases proceeded
through the courts.
All of this changed in December of 2017, when the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) appointed Judge Dan Polster to hear all of the
lawsuits pending in federal courts which involved local government
plaintiffs.3 A federal statute authorizes the JPML to consolidate cases and
transfer them to a single federal district court in order to conduct discovery
and rule on certain pretrial motions. In theory, these cases will be returned to
the transferor court at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. However, it is
matter of common knowledge that most cases that are consolidated in this
fashion are ultimately settled.4 Indeed, Judge Polster has made no secret of
his desire to have the parties reach a global settlement in this case. 5

1.

See Richard C. Ausness, The Role ofLitigation in theFightAgainstPrescriptionDrug

Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1121-22 (2014).
2.

The first of these lawsuits was brought against Purdue Pharma by the City of Chicago.

See Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded, City of Chi. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:14-cv-04361
(N.D. Ill. July, 17, 2014) [hereinafter City of Chicago Complaint]. See generally City of Chi. v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. 111. 2016).
3.
See Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html.
4.
See Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in

MultidistrictLitigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2329 (2008) (quoting DeLaventura v. Columbia
Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (D. Mass. 2006)).
5.

Opioid

See Daniel Fisher, Plaintiff Lawyers See Nationwide Settlement as Only End for

Lawsuits,

FORBES

(Mar.

6,

2018,

6:39

AM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/06/plaintiff-lawyers-see-nationwidesettlement-as-only-end-for-opioid-lawsuits/#24dfc3c57bc2.
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Although it is possible-and even likely that most of these opioid cases
will be settled, it is still necessary to consider the relative strength of the
liability theories and defenses available to the respective parties. This
information is relevant for the following reasons: First, some plaintiffs may
opt out of the proposed settlement and elect to take their cases to trial. Second,
at least some cases will be litigated in bellwether trials in order to provide the
other parties with information about the value of their cases. Third, the
strength or weakness of the plaintiffs' cases will have a significant impact on
the size of any global settlement that might be reached. And finally, the
strength of liability theories and defenses of individual litigants will affect
how the settlement funds are allocated among them. For these reasons, it may
be useful to evaluate these various claims and defenses even if an eventual
global settlement is likely.
In this Article, I will consider whether the defendants can successfully
resist the plaintiffs' claims even if the plaintiffs' narrative is substantially true.
Consequently, it will examine both the plaintiffs' liability theories and any
defenses or limitations on liability that may be available to the defendants.
Part II of the Article discusses some of the liability theories that plaintiffs have
relied upon to support their claims against the defendants. These include
public nuisance, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, violation of
statute, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Part III identifies a number
of defenses and doctrines that potentially limit liability, including statutes of
limitation, cause-in-fact, duty, proximate cause, shifting responsibility,
restrictions on recovery for purely economic losses, regulatory compliance
and scienter. The Article concludes by briefly considering a number of
possible outcomes to the current opioid litigation.
II.

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS

Plaintiffs lawyers typically put forth as many liability theories as
possible in their pleadings, including some that are novel or highly
questionable, in the hope that at least one of them will survive a motion to
dismiss. This part of the Article will examine some of the more popular
liability theories, including public nuisance, fraud, negligent marketing,
statutory violations, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.
A.

Public Nuisance Claims

In order to constitute a public nuisance, the activity or condition must: (1)
substantially interfere with a right held in common by the public; (2) be
unreasonable; (3) be within the defendant's control and be capable of
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abatement by the defendant; and (4) proximately cause the injury in question. 6
At the same time, nuisance law in the United States is highly diverse. For
example, some courts have limited liability to activities that take place on or
affect real property or violate a statute. In addition, a few jurisdictions restrict
damage awards to costs actually incurred by the government to abate the
nuisance.7

Interference with a public right is essential to any public nuisance claim.'
A public right is a right common to all members of the general public and not
merely one that is enjoyed by a large number of people. 9 Indeed, as one court
declared, "[t]he test is not the number of persons annoyed, but the possibility
of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights."'o Because this right
is collective in nature, it is distinguishable from an individual right not to be
assaulted, defamed, defrauded, or negligently injured."
Courts have sometimes invoked the public right requirement to dismiss
public nuisance claims in cases involving firearms and lead-based paints.12
For example, in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation,3 the City of
Chicago and Cook County sued various manufacturers, distributors, and retail
dealers of handguns to recoup the cost of medical treatment, law enforcement,
prosecutions of gun law violators, and other expenses associated with gun
violence. 14 The plaintiffs alleged that the sale of illegal firearms constituted a
public nuisance because it violated laws "designed to protect the public from
a threat to its health, welfare and safety." '5 On appeal from a decision by the
lower court, the Illinois Supreme Court suggested that the public right claimed

6.
Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Can GovernmentsImpose
A New Tort Duty to Prevent ExternalRisks? The "No-Fault" Theories Behind Today's HighStakes Government Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 940 (2009) (citing Victor
E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of PublicNuisance: MaintainingRationalBoundaries
on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 562-70 (2006)).
7.
See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 330 (Ct. App.
2006); City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1240 (Ind. 2003);
In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 498-99 (N.J. 2007).
8.
See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 6, at 562-64 (quoting Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 958 (R.I. 1994)).
9.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
10. Ganimv. Smith& Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 132 (Conn. 2001).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1B cmt. g. However, a private individual
who is injured by a public nuisance can sue for damages if his injury is a "special injury" that is
distinct from that suffered by the general public. See id. § 821C.
12. See, e.g., Ganim, 780 A.2d at 133; City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d
1099, 1115-16 (Ill. 2004); In re Lead Paint, 924 A.2d at 505; State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951
A.2d 428, 448 (R.I. 2008).
13. 821 N.E.2d at 1099.
14. Id. at 1105-06.
15. Id. at 1107.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/4

4

Ausness: The Current State of Opioid Litigation
2019]

OPIOID LITIGATION

569

by the City was nothing more than an assertion of an individual's right not to
be assaulted.1 6 The court concluded that if it recognized such a right, a similar
claim might be made against brewers and distillers whose products caused
injuries by drunken drivers to others on the road.'"
The public right issue also arose in several of the lead-paint cases.'1 State
v. Lead Industries Associationl9 is illustrative. In that case, the Attorney
General of Rhode Island filed suit against a number of paint manufacturers
and their trade association, claiming that the lead pigment in their products
caused various injuries to small children who were exposed to peeling paint
in older houses in the state.20 The plaintiff sought compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and injunctive relief to require the defendants to remove
lead pigment paint in those buildings that were accessible to children and to
fund various educational and lead-poisoning prevention programs. 21
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that expanding the
concept of public right to include being free from contamination in private
housing "would be antithetical to the common law and would lead to a
widespread expansion of public nuisance law that never was intended . ."22
On the other hand, another court concluded in City of Gary ex rel. King
v. Smith & Wesson Corp.23 that Indiana's public nuisance statute was broad
enough to include within its scope a claim that the defendant manufacturers'
and distributors' marketing practices with respect to the sale of handgunsinterfered with the exercise of a public right.24 The statute in question declared
that conduct that was "injurious to health, indecent, offensive to the senses or
an obstruction to the free use of property so as essentially to interfere with the
comfortable use of property" was a nuisance. 25
It is likely that opioid sellers will claim that the addiction to opioid
medications affects opioid users as individuals, as opposed to the public at
large. They will maintain that the right to be free from the effects of addiction
is no different than the right to be free from assault, battery or defamation. In
response, the plaintiffs will argue that while this argument might be relevant
to asbestos and lead paint contamination, where injuries were largely

16.
17.
18.
951 A.2d
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1116.
Id.
In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 505 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n,
428, 448 (R.I. 2008).
951 A.2d at 428.
Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 440.
Id at 453.
801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
Id. at 1229-30.
Id. at 1229 (quoting IND. CODE § 32-30-6-6 (2017)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 4
570

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 565

'

associated with property damage, it is less compelling when the damage
affects public health and quality of life.
In addition, to be held liable for maintaining a nuisance, the defendant
must be able to exercise control over the offending activity or condition. There
appears to be two aspects to the control requirement. The first involves
whether the defendants exercised control over the instrumentality or condition
at the time that it caused harm to the public. The second involves whether the
defendant has maintained sufficient control over the instrumentality or
condition so that it can abate it if ordered to do so by a court.
Control over the instrumentality or condition that caused the harm has
come up in a number of asbestos, handgun, and lead-based paint cases. For
example, in State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court declared: "[a]s an additional prerequisite to the imposition of
liability for public nuisance, a defendant must have control over the
instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance at the time the damage occurs." 26
Finding that the defendant lead paint manufacturers lacked control over their
products at the time the damage occurred, the court held that they could not
be held responsible for any harm that their products caused after the time of
sale.27
This rule seems to rest on causation principles. As the court in City of
Philadelphiav. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation28 pointed out, "[because] the gun
manufacturers do not exercise significant control over the source of the
interference with the public right . .. the causal chain is too attenuated to make
out a public nuisance claim." 29 However, not every court has agreed with this
30
reasoning. Thus, in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation,
the
Ohio Supreme Court concluded that, while the defendants did not physically
control the actual firearms at the time the nuisance was created, they did
contribute to the creation of the nuisance by "marketing, distributing and
selling firearms in a manner that facilitated their flow into the illegal
market." 3
Retail gun dealers also raised lack of control as a defense in City of
32
Chicagov. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation.
However, in that case, the court held
that control was merely a "relevant factor" in deciding the proximate cause

26.
27.
(3rd Cir.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

951 A.2d 428, 449 (R.I. 2008).
Id. at 449-50; see also Camden Cty. Bd. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541
2001) (applying the lack of control argument to a case against firearm manufacturers).
277 F.3d 415 (3rd Cir. 2002).
Id. at 422.
768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
Id. at 1143.
821 N.E.2d 1099, 1128 (Ill. 2004).
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issue and in determining what relief to give the plaintiff.33 Thus, "[i]f a public
nuisance later results from the illegal use of the firearms by third parties,
liability in public nuisance is not necessarily precluded simply because
defendants no longer control the objects." 34
Lack of control may also be relevant when a government entity seeks to
compel the defendants to abate the nuisance. Thus, in City of Manchester v.
National Gypsum Co., 3 5 when the City sought to recover the costs of asbestos
removal from certain public buildings, the court pointed out that the City, not
the defendants, was now in possession of the affected property.3 6 According
to the court, "[t]he defendants, after the time of manufacture and sale, no
longer had the power to abate the nuisance. Therefore, a basic element of the
tort of nuisance is absent, and the plaintiff cannot succeed on this theory of
relief."3 7 In another asbestos removal case, the court also concluded that the
defendants gave up legal control over their products at the time of sale and,
therefore, lacked the legal right to abate whatever hazards their products
posed.38

On the other hand, this argument was rejected by a California appellate
court in Santa Clara I. 9 In that case, the defendants contended that the
plaintiffs' public nuisance action must fail "because defendants lacked the
ability to abate the alleged nuisance, and abatement was the only remedy that
[the plaintiffs] could seek." 40 In response, the court ruled that the complaint
was not defective for failure to affirmatively allege that the defendants had the
ability to abate the nuisance. 4' The same court reiterated this conclusion in
People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. 42

Opioid sellers will no doubt maintain that they lacked sufficient control
over their products once they left their possession after they were sold to
downstream purchasers. Government plaintiffs would presumably respond

33. Id. at 1132.
34. Id.
35. 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.R.I. 1986).
36. Id. at 656.
37. Id.
38. See Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); see also Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 920 (8th Cir. 1993);
Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 133 (D.N.H. 1984).
39. Cty. of Santa Clara v. AtI. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 330 (Ct. App. 2006).
40. Id. at 329.
41. Id. at 330.
42. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 549 (Ct. App. 2017). On May 16, 2018, one of the defendants,
NL Industries, settled the case against them for $60 million. See Peter Hayes, NL Industries
Settles Cal. Lead PaintPublic Nuisance Claims, BLOOMBERG L. (May 17, 2018, 11:24 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/nl-industries-settles-cal-leadpaint-public-nuisance-claims.
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that it was sufficient that the defendants controlled the marketing practices
that contributed to a nuisance. One can argue that the control requirement
should be limited to situations where the defendant would have a legal right
to enter the land in order to correct the condition or regulate the activity in
question. However, when land is not involved in the creation of the nuisance,
the court should still be able to order the defendant to change its marketing
practices in a way that eliminates or ameliorates the nuisance.
Furthermore, some courts restrict public nuisance claims to those that
affect real property or to cases that involve an illegal act. 43 Texas v. American
Tobacco Co. 44 is illustrative of this approach. In that case, the state brought a
public nuisance action against the defendants in order to recover the costs of
providing medical care to its citizens for illnesses related to the consumption
of tobacco products. 45 Ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss, 46 the

court concluded that the public nuisance claim was defective because the state
failed to allege either that the defendants improperly used their own property
or that the plaintiff had been injured in the use of its own property. 47
A federal district court reached a similar conclusion in Independence
County v. Pfizer, Inc. 48 In this case, a number of local government entities in
Arkansas brought suit against the producers and sellers of certain over-thecounter cold remedies which contained ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. 49 The
plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew that their products were being used by
criminals to make methamphetamine but resisted efforts to regulate the sale
of these drugs.50 As a result, illegal "meth labs" caused explosions, fires,
chemical burns, chemical spills, and toxic fires.5 ' In addition, the plaintiffs
claimed that they had incurred substantial costs as a result of widespread
addiction among their residents. 52 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' public nuisance claim and quoted from an opinion by the Arkansas
Supreme Court which defined a nuisance as "conduct by one landowner which
unreasonably interferes the use and enjoyment of the lands of another." 53

43. See City of Phila. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 420 (3rd Cir. 2002); Tex. v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Indep. Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 534 F. Supp.
2d 882, 890 (E.D. Ark. 2008); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 495-96 (N.J. 2007).
44. 14 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
45. Id
46. Id at 961.
47. Id at 973.
48. 534 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
49. Id at 884.
50. Id. at 884-85.
51. Id at 885.
52. Id
53. Id. at 890 (quoting Milligan v. General Oil Co., 738 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Ark. 1987)).
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However, other courts have ruled with that ownership of real property is
not essential to maintaining a public nuisance claim. 5 For example, in City of

Chicago v. Beretta, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court should
not have dismissed plaintiffs' public nuisance claim and instead concluded
"that neither the use or misuse of land nor invasion of property rights of
another is required for a public nuisance to be found" and, consequently,
"plaintiffs' theory of liability is not absolutely foreclosed by the existing
common law of public nuisance." 5 5

Thus, there is a split of authority on the question of whether an activity or
condition, other than one that is per se unlawful, must either take place on the
defendant's land or adversely affect public land in order to qualify as a public
nuisance. Consequently, in some states a public nuisance claim would fail if
the nuisance did not occur on either the defendant's or the plaintiffs
property. 56
Finally, in some state governments plaintiffs are not allowed to sue for
prospective damages in public nuisance actions, but instead are limited to
claims for abatement and for recoupment of the costs of past abatement
efforts.5 7 For example, in In re Lead Paint Litigation,5

the New Jersey

Supreme Court distinguished between a public nuisance brought by a private
party who has suffered a special injury different in kind than the one suffered
by the general public. 59 The court observed that in such cases, the private
plaintiff could seek damages, but the government entity could only seek
abatement or recoupment of past abatement expenses. 60
On the other hand, the Indiana Supreme Court in City of Gary ex rel. King
v. Smith & Wesson Corp. allowed the City to proceed with a damage claim.61

However, the court based its decision on a state statute that expressly allowed
all plaintiffs, including municipalities, to recover damages in a nuisance

54. See City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1111 (111. 2004); Young
v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1089 (Ill. 2004); City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232-33 (Ind. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768
N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002).
55. 821 N.E.2dat 1105-06.
56. On the other hand, pharmacies and pain clinics that operated as "pill mills" might be
subject to abatement as public nuisances.
57. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 330 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006); Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d at 1240; In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 49899 (N.J. 2007).
58. 924 A.2d 484.
59. Id. at 498.
60. Id. at 498-99; see also Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products
Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 782 (2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821(C)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
61. See 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1240 (Ind. 2003).
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action.62 In addition, a California intermediate appellate court in Santa Clara
I ruled that the plaintiffs in a lead paint case did not have to affirmatively
allege in the complaint that the defendants had the ability to abate the alleged
nuisance. 63 Finally, in People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., the State of
California brought suit against various manufacturers and sellers of lead paint
to compel them to contribute to a fund created for the purpose of removing
lead paint from residential houses. 64 The trial court awarded $1.15 billion for
this purpose. 65 The court acknowledged that a public entity could not recover
any funds that it had already spent to remediate a public nuisance. 66
Nevertheless, it rejected the defendants' characterization of the abatement
fund as a "thinly-disguised" damage award and upheld the trial court's
ruling. 67
Although public nuisance is a popular and appealing liability theory for
government plaintiffs, the law in this area is far from uniform. In particular,
there is disagreement among the different states over the definition of public
rights, whether the defendant must be able to exercise control over the
instrumentality that causes harm, whether liability is restricted to conditions
or activities on land, and whether government entities can recover damages in
a public nuisance action. These differences cannot be summarily brushed
away in multidistrict litigation.
B. Negligence Claims
To recover under negligence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to protect
him against harm; (2) that the defendant breached this duty by failing to
exercise reasonable care; (3) that the defendant's unreasonable conduct was a
cause-in-fact and a proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm; and (4) that the
plaintiff suffered damage as a consequence of the defendant's conduct. 68 So
far, government plaintiffs have charged opioid manufacturers and sellers with
various forms of negligence, including negligent marketing, gross negligence,
and negligence per se.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1984).

Id.
See Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 330.
227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 569.
Id.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
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Negligent Marketing

The concept of negligent marketing assumes that product sellers should
not engage in marketing strategies that significantly increase the risk that their
products will be purchased by consumers who will injure themselves or
others.69
The first type of negligent marketing involves products that designed to
appeal to unsuitable consumers, such as criminals.70 Negligent marketing may
also include the targeting of advertising or other promotional efforts at
unsuitable or vulnerable members of the public.7 ' The last type of marketing
practice involves the failure to supervise illegal or tortious conduct by
distributors and retail sellers.72
Each of these forms of negligent marketing is potentially available to
government plaintiffs in the context of opioid litigation. For example, the
manufacture of high-dosage opioid pills whose time-release mechanism could
be easily defeated made it highly probable that these products would be
misused by drug abusers. Furthermore, according to government plaintiffs,
opioid manufacturers have targeted vulnerable groups such as veterans and
the elderly. Finally, manufacturers, distributors, and retail pharmacies have all
been charged with failing to monitor drug sales and report suspicious activities
to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as required by
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
2.

Gross Negligence

A defendant may be liable of gross negligence if he fails to exercise even
slight care 73 or, in some states, if he has actual knowledge of the risk and acts

69. Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An
Analysis and Critique of the Concept ofNegligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 912 (2002);
Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing ofHandguns: Strict Liability is Dead, Long Live
Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 800-18 (1995).
70. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 154 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'don other
grounds, 28 P.3d 116, 131 (Cal. 2001).
71. An example of this practice was the infamous cartoon character, "Joe Camel," who
was intended to create a favorable impression of smoking in the minds of young children. See
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking BehavioralismSeriously: Some Evidence ofMarket
Manipulation, 112 FARV. L. REV. 1420, 1481 (1999); Kathleen J. Lester, Note, Cowboys,
Camels, and Commercial Speech: Is the Tobacco Industry's Commodification of Childhood
Protectedby the FirstAmendment?, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 615, 628-29 (1997).
72. See, e.g., City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith& Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222,124142 (Ind. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1144-45 (Ohio
2002).
73. Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 429 N.E.2d 738, 740 (N.Y. 1981).
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recklessly in the face of it. 74 In the latter case, the defendant's conduct may

be described as highly unreasonable "involving an extreme departure from
ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." 7 5 For
example, in one case, the City of Everett, Washington charged Purdue with
gross negligence in connection with its failure to prevent a Los Angeles
pharmacy from supplying a criminal drug ring with opioid products that were
subsequently shipped from California to Everett. Other plaintiffs may be able
to bring gross negligence claims against manufacturers, distributors and retail
pharmacies if they can prove that these defendants knew that opioids were
being diverted for illicit uses and failed to take any action to prevent the
diversions from occurring.
3.

Negligence per se

Under the doctrine of negligence per se, the court will treat an unexcused
violation of a statute or ordinance as unreasonable as a matter of law. 76 In
other words, the standard of care is conclusively determined by the conduct
required by the legislative body that promulgated the statute.77 The only way
that one who violates a statute can avoid liability is to show that either the
violation should be excused, that the violation was not a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff s injury, that the plaintiff was not within the class of persons that the
statute was designed to protect, or that the plaintiffs injuries did not fall
within the scope of harm the statute was designed to address. 78
Opioid manufacturers, distributors, and retail sellers have been charged
with and in some cases convicted of violating statutes dealing with
consumer protection and unfair trade practices, false claims, racketeering, and
regulation of controlled substances. Assuming that the plaintiffs can prove
that the defendants violated these statutes, the only way to avoid the effect of
negligence per se would be for the defendants to convince a court that these
statutes were narrow in focus and were not intended to protect state and local
governments against the effects of opioid abuse and addiction.

74. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 34, at 212-13.
75. Id. § 34, at 214; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
77. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 36, at 220.
78. Id. § 36, at 224-29.
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C. FraudulentMisrepresentationand FraudulentConcealment Claims
Fraudulent misrepresentation involves a false representation by the
defendant that is material and is made with knowledge of its falsity or in a
manner that is reckless as to whether it is true or false, and with the intent of
inducing the plaintiff to rely upon it. 79 In addition, the plaintiff must rely on
the defendant's statement and it must proximately cause the resulting injury. 0
On the other hand, fraudulent concealment requires proof that: the defendant
concealed a material fact or remained silent when he or she had a duty to
disclose this information to the plaintiff; the defendant acted with scienter; the
defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the concealment; and the
defendant's conduct caused harm to the plaintiff."
In the past, some government entities claimed that the manufacturers of
products such as cigarettes, asbestos insulation, and lead-based paint were
guilty of fraud. 82 A number of these claims were eventually dropped, and the
principal issue with the remaining fraud claims was whether they were
pleaded with sufficient particularity to satisfy the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,83 which required that the circumstances constituting fraud be
stated with particularity. 8 4 For example, in City of Manchester v. National
Gypsum Co., the defendant asbestos manufacturer moved to dismiss the City's
fraud claim for lack of particularity. 5 The court agreed that the pleadings
were not specific enough; however, it allowed the plaintiff to amend its
complaint in order to correct this deficiency.86 Other courts have relaxed the
particularity requirement when they felt that the defendant was already fully

79. See Tex. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 974 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (citing
Crawford Painting & Drywall Co. v. J.W. Bateson Co., 857 F.2d 981, 985 (5th Cir. 1988));
Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citing Debbs v.
Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).
80. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 974; Goldstein, 854 A.2d at 591.
81. See Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1987).
82. See Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1993)
(asbestos); Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (tobacco); City of Manchester v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 654-56 (D.R.I. 1986) (asbestos); Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist.
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 135-36 (D.N.H. 1984) (asbestos); Cty. of Santa Clara
v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 319 (Ct. App. 2006) (lead-based paint); In re Lead
Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 487 (N.J. 2007) (lead-based paint). It should be noted that the
government entities sued as property owners rather than in their governmental capacity in some
of the asbestos cases.
83. See Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 974; Nat'l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. at 65456; Hooksett Sch. Dist., 617 F. Supp. at 135-36; U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. at 293-94.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
85. 637 F. Supp. 646.
86. Id. at 654-55.
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aware of the facts involved. Thus, in Town ofHooksett School Districtv. W.R.
Grace Co.,7 when the defendant asbestos company demanded that the
plaintiff provide more detail about false statements that the defendant
allegedly made about its asbestos products in some of its advertisements, the
court responded that the defendant was "ably situated to know what
advertisements were made around the date of purchase in the instant case.""
Furthermore, the court went on to declare that "the Defendant is in a better
position than the Plaintiff to know what medical and scientific tests had been
conducted on asbestos products, what safety information was known, and
what information was withheld." 89 Consequently, the court denied the
defendant's Rule 12(e) motion.90 Several other courts have relied on the same
reasoning to deny such motions. 9 1
The requirement to plead allegations of fraud with particularity should
not be a problem in opioid litigation. As in the asbestos cases, the opioid
manufacturers have sufficient information about their alleged acts of
fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment to enable them to
draft responsive pleadings. In addition, the pleadings of the various plaintiffs
contain a great number of specific examples of false statements and
concealments. While there is little doubt that opioid manufacturers engaged
in widespread misrepresentation and concealment, there could be problems
proving injury or reliance. First of all, it is doubtful that government entities
can stand in the shoes of individuals who have suffered personal injuries. The
personal injuries suffered by these individuals are clearly different from the
economic injuries incurred by the government plaintiffs.
Proving reliance could be an even greater problem. Before proceeding
further, it is necessary to distinguish between fraud as it relates to
prescriptions provided by government entities to employees or welfare
recipients and fraud as it relates to the problem of opioid addiction in the
general community. In the first case, the government plaintiffs may be able to
claim that the defendants' misrepresentations caused them to pay for
unnecessary or excessive amounts of drugs. 92 Even though the fraud was not
specifically directed at government health care providers, they were clearly

87. 617 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.H. 1984).
88. Id. at 135.
89. Id. at 136.
90. Id.
91. See Nat'l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. at 654-55; U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. at
293-94.
92. See Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded ¶ 278, at 74, Cty. of Lackawanna v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. 17-CV5156 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sep. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Lackawanna
Complaint].
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the ultimate targets since they would pay for the drugs that were prescribed,
as well as for any opioid treatment. Indeed, that appears to be the focus of the
fraud claim in those complaints that have addressed the reliance issue.
Proving reliance would be especially difficult in cases where government
plaintiffs seek to recover for the costs of dealing with the overall consequences
of opioid addiction. The false assurances made by drug companies about the
safety and effectiveness of opioid therapy were directed at health
professionals and potential patients, rather than at government entities. Even
if these representations eventually reached government entities, it is hard to
see that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on them or that the opioid epidemic
directly resulted from any such reliance that might have occurred.
In sum, the plaintiffs' common law fraud claims are problematic.
Traditionally, fraud is viewed as a relational tort: For example, assume that A
owes a duty not to misrepresent a material fact to B or to conceal a material
fact from him; A intentionally misrepresents or conceals a material fact; B
relies on this and suffers an injury as a result. A would be liable to B. However,
in this case, no such relationship exists. Although A has misrepresented or
concealed material facts from B, no relationship exists with C that would give
rise to a duty nor is there is anything that would cause C to rely on A. That
being the case, it is difficult to see how A can be liable to C under these
circumstances.
4.

Statutory Violation Claims

Government plaintiffs have also claimed that opioid sellers violated
consumer protection and unfair competition laws, statutes prohibiting false
claims and Medicaid fraud, and federal and state anti-racketeering (RICO)
statutes.
a.

Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition
Statutes

At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to
protect consumers against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 93 In addition, every state has enacted legislation to protect
consumers against fraudulent practices or higher prices caused by unfair

93.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
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competition.94 These laws are referred to as Unfair or Deceptive Acts and
Practices (UDAP), Consumer Protection Acts (CPA), or Unfair or Deceptive
Trade Practices Acts (UDTPA). 9 5 Most of these statutes authorize the state
Attorney General to issue regulations to define prohibited conduct. 96 Unlike
the case of common law fraud, a statutory violation usually does not require
proof of either harm or reliance. 97
A number of state and local governments have alleged that the marketing
and distribution of opioid products violated various consumer protection
statutes. 98 For example, Lackawanna County's complaint alleges that the

94. See Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of
Unfair or Deceptive Acts and PracticesLaws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 U. KAN.
L. REv. 209, 211 (2016).
95. Id. at 209 & n.1.
96. Id. at 212.
97. Id. at 215-16.
98. See Complaint & Trial by Jury Requested ¶¶ 160-64, at 51-53, Ala. v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., No. 2:18-CV-89 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Alabama Complaint]; Complaint T
159-7 1, at 69-73, Alaska v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3AN-17-09966CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct.
30, 2017) [hereinafter Alaska Complaint]; Petition T 166-76, at 41-43, Cherokee Nation v.
McKesson Corp., No. CV-2017-203 (D. Cherokee Nation Apr. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Cherokee
Nation Complaint]; City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 274-96, at 96-103; Complaint
& Trial by Jury of 12 Demanded ¶¶ 225-28, at 90-92, Del. ex rel. Denn v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. N18C-01-223 MMJ CCLD (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Delaware Complaint];
Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶ 233-44, at 64-67, Del. Cty. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.
17-8095 (Pa. Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Delaware County Complaint]; Complaint T 89-94, at
21-22, City of Everett v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 17-2-00469-31 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 19,
2017) [hereinafter City of Everett Complaint]; Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded¶¶ 233-46, at
42-44, Florida v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 72158675 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2018) [hereinafter
Florida Complaint]; Lackawanna Complaint, supra note 92, ¶¶ 269-76, at 71-74; Complaint T
245-61, at 68-71, Massachusetts v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884CV01808 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Jun. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Massachusetts Complaint]; Complaint T 614-21, at 227-33,
Mississippi v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 25CHI:15-CV-001814 (Miss. Ch. Dec. 15, 2015)
[hereinafter Mississippi Complaint]; Petition & Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶ 240-95, at 27-36, Mo.
ex rel. Hawley v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No.1722-CC10626 (Mo. Cir. Ct. June 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Missouri Complaint]; Complaint T 148-53, at 52-54, Montana v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., No. ADV-2017-949 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Montana Complaint];
Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶ 205-38, at 58-63, ¶¶ 267-86, at 68-71, Navajo Nation v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:18-CV-338 (D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Navajo Nation
Complaint]; Complaint T 206-38, at 77-83, New Hampshire v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1:17CV-427 (N.H. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2017) [hereinafter New Hampshire Complaint]; Complaint
for Violation of the N.J. False Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-1, et seq., as well as Other Claims
¶¶ 262-88, at 91-96, Porrino v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. ESX-CC-00245-17 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Oct. 31, 2017) [hereinafter New Jersey Complaint]; Plaintiffs Complaint for Damages,
Restitution, & Civil Penalties ¶¶ 249-78, at 92-101, N.M. ex rel. Balderas v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., No. 1:18-cv-00386 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter New Mexico Complaint];
Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded & Endorsed Hereon ¶¶ 178-92, at 72-81, Ohio ex rel.
DeWine v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 17-CI-261 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 31, 2017) [hereinafter
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defendants violated the law inter alia by claiming that opioid drugs were safe
and effective for the long-term treatment of chronic pain in order to deceive
them into prescribing opioids for this purpose. 99 It also claims that the
defendants disseminated misleading statements to doctors and patients that
concealed the risk of addiction and espoused the scientifically unproven
theory of "pseudoaddiction."oo In addition, they provided financial support
to pro-opioid doctors and front groups in order to avoid state and federal
labeling regulations.101 Furthermore, the drug companies sponsored
misleading CME programs and scientific studies to persuade doctors that they
could safely prescribe opioids to treat chronic pain.1 02 Finally, the complaint
alleged that sales representatives of the defendants made deceptive statements
about opioids to doctors during the course of person-to-person detailing.1 03
The complaint concluded by declaring that these deceptive marketing
practices resulted in "increased expenditures on public healthcare services,
law enforcement, the justice system, child and family services as well as lost
productivity and lost tax revenue."1 04
This sort of conduct, which is typical of the conduct alleged in most of
the other complaints, would seem to meet the statutory definition of
"deceptive" or "unfair." Thus, a strong argument can be made that
government plaintiffs who allege that the defendants violated state
consumer protection or unfair competition statutes-can avoid dismissal of
their claims. This occurred in City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 0 5
where the City alleged that the defendant opioid manufacturers engaged in
various deceptive marketing practices in violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act (ICFA).1 06 The district court
observed that the state Attorney General was not required to prove that the
defendants' actions proximately harmed any consumers in order to establish
standing to sue under ICFA. 107 Instead, it declared that a deceptive practice

Ohio Complaint]; Complaint TT 228-40, at 83-89, Seattle v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2:17-cv01577 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 28,2017) [hereinafter City of Seattle Complaint]; State of Texas's
Original Petition TT 11.1-11.4, at 27-29, Texas v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. D-1-GN-18-2403
(Dist. Ct. Tx. May 15, 2018) [hereinafter Texas Complaint].
99. Lackawanna Complaint, supra note 92, ¶ 270, at 71-72.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
106. Id. at 1070.
107. Id. at 1071.
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violated the Act even if it did not actually deceive or injure anyone.10s
Consequently, the court concluded that the City alleged a claim under ICFA
against each of the defendants.1 09
b.

False Claims and MedicaidFraudStatutes

A few complaints have accused opioid sellers of violating false claims or
Medicaid fraud laws. 0 These statutes are modeled after the federal False
Claims Act,"'
which imposes liability on any person who 'knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented [to the United States Government], a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval' or who 'knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement' to get
a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.112
According to the government plaintiffs, fraudulent misrepresentations
and other illegal marketing practices by opioid sellers caused them to pay for
treatments that were either inappropriate or ineffective. 13 The New
Hampshire complaint is illustrative. The state statute in that case provides that
a violation occurs when any person "[k]nowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, to an officer or employee of the department [of Health and Human
Services], a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval."11 4 According
to the complaint, opioid sellers made various false and misleading statements
about the risks and benefits of using opioids to treat chronic pain in order to
persuade doctors to prescribe them for this purpose. 115 However, the state's
Medicaid program was only authorized to pay the cost of prescription drugs

108. Id.
109. Id. at 1074.
110. See Alabama Complaint, supra note 98, TT 180-91, at 55-57; City of Chicago
Complaint, supra note 98, TT 315-17, at 108; Mississippi Complaint, supra note 98, TT 604-13,
at 225-27; Missouri Complaint, supra note 98, TT 296-313, at 36-41; Montana Complaint,
supra note 98, TT 154-68, at 54-58; New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 98, TT 239-58, at
83-87; New Jersey Complaint, supra note 98, TT 289-96, at 97-87; New Mexico Complaint,
supra note 98, TT 279-93, at 101-04; Ohio Complaint, supra note 98, TT 193-203, at 81-83.
111. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012).
112. Id. § 3729(a)(1).
113. See, e.g., Ohio Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 245, at 99.
114. New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 240, at 83 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 167:61-b(1)(a) (2012)).
115. Id. T 242-246, at 84.
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that were "medically necessary."" 6 According to the complaint, doctors,
pharmacists, and other health care providers relied on the defendants' false
and misleading statements when they assured Medicaid officials that opioids
were medically necessary to treat chronic pain."' But for the defendants'
statements, these false claims would never have been submitted to the state
for payment."
Plaintiffs who have relied upon false claim statutes appear to have a
strong primafacie case. First of all, it appears that opioid manufacturers and
their third-party allies misrepresented the efficacy of opioids for the long-term
treatment of chronic pain and also misrepresented or omitted information
about the risks of addiction if opioids were used for this purpose. However, it
is less obvious that opioid therapy is entirely useless, or that doctors or
Medicaid officials were fooled by the defendants into prescribing opioids
inappropriately. Thus, to sustain their false claim allegations, the plaintiffs
will have to identify which opioid prescriptions were appropriate for the
medical condition involved and which were not.
The false claims issue arose in City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P,
where the City alleged that the defendant opioid manufacturers, through their
deceptive marketing practices, caused prescribing physicians to submit false
statements to it in order to obtain payment for fraudulent claims. 19 The
defendants contended, inter alia, that the City failed to establish a sufficient
causal connection between its conduct and the presentation of false claims by
prescribing physicians.' 20 They identified a number of intervening events,
such as the prescribers' independent medical judgment, patients' preferences,
patients' decisions to fill their prescriptions, patients' decisions on how to use
their medication, and the City's decision to pay for opioid prescriptions. 121
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the City's payments of false claims was
a foreseeable outcome of the misrepresentations that defendants made to
Chicago-area physicians.1 22

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. 246, at 84.
Id. 246, at 85.
Id. 251, at 86.
211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1076 (N.D. 111. 2016).
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1081.
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RICO

'

Congress enacted the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)' 23 in 1970 to combat the infiltration of legitimate
business enterprises by organized crime.' 2 4 RICO imposes liability on any
person who invests income from a pattern of racketeering activity in an
enterprise, acquires an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, conducts an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity, or who conspires with others to do any of these things.1 25
The RICO statute defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."126 According to
RICO, racketeering activity includes such criminal acts as mail fraud, wire
fraud, drug trafficking, murder, arson, gambling, extortion, bribery, and
embezzlement.1 27 RICO also requires that the defendant engage in a pattern
of racketeering activity, which consists of two or more acts that reflect a
relationship and continuity of purpose, results, participants, victims, or
methods, but which are sufficiently distinct so that they amount to more than
a single episode or an isolated occurrence and which occur within ten years
of each other. 128 These offenses are referred to as "predicate acts."1 29
Health care organizations have invoked RICO on a number of occasions
seeking to recover from pharmaceutical companies for promoting off-label
uses of prescription drugs. 3 0 For example, in the Neurontin case, Kaiser
Foundation Health Care Plan (Kaiser) and other health care insurers claimed
that Pfizer engaged in a fraudulent marketing campaign to encourage doctors
to prescribe Neurontin for off-label uses in violation of federal law.' 3

123. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012 & Supp. 12017).
124. See Richard C. Ausness, "There's Danger Here, Cherie! ": Liability for the
Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 1253, 1264 (2008) (citing Beth S. Schipper, Note, Civil Rico and Parens Patriae:
Lowering Litigation Barriers Through State Intervention, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 431
(1983)).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
126. Id. § 1961(4).
127. Id. § 1961(1).
128. Id. § 1961(5).
129. Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (2012)).
130. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2013);
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 941 (8th Cir. 1999).
131. See Neurontin Adktg. & Sales PracticesLitig., 712 F.3d at 28. The United States
brought a criminal case against Pfizer and its subsidiary, Warner-Lambert. Id. at 25. Warner-
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Neurontin was originally approved by the FDA for the treatment of epilepsy,
but the defendant sought to increase the sales of this product by promoting it
for the treatment of bipolar disorder, migraine, neuropathic pain, and at
dosages exceeding the FDA-approved level of 1800 mg per day.' 32
The jury found that this marketing campaign involved: "(1) direct
marketing (or detailing) to doctors, which misrepresented Neurontin's
effectiveness for off-label uses; (2) sponsoring misleading informational
supplements and continuing medical education (CME) programs; and (3)
suppressing
negative
information
about . .. Neurontin's
off-label
effectiveness." 133 Kaiser and the other plaintiffs alleged that these efforts
influenced both formulary and prescribing decisions, causing them to pay for
treatments that were ineffective or less effective than cheaper alternatives. 134
The jury found in Kaiser's favor and rendered an award of $47 million which
was increased by the trial court to $142 million.1 35
Some government plaintiffs in opioid cases have alleged that opioid
manufacturers also violated RICO or comparable state RICO statutes.1 36 For
example, the City of Lansing's complaint argues that the defendants were
guilty of multiple RICO violations.1 37 The complaint alleged that the RICO
defendants were "persons" because they were capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property.1 38 The complaint also declared that the
defendants were involved in a number of illegal enterprises.1 39 The first
category was described as a diversion enterprise in which manufacturers,
distributors and retail sellers "engaged in a conspiracy to expand the market
for opioid drugs-thus inflating their own profits without regard to legal
requirements that Defendants take action to prevent the diversion of drugs to

Lambert pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a criminal fine of $240 million, while Pfizer agreed
to pay $190 in civil fines. Id.
132. Id. at 26.
133. Id. at 28.
134. See id. at 28-31.
135. Id. at 26.
136. See Florida Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 247-59, at 44-47. Complaint for (1) Pub.
Nuisance; (2) Negligence Per Se; (3) Negligence; & (4) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced
& Corrupt Org. Act T 519-613, at 119-46, City of Lansing v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:17CV-01 1 14-JTN-ESC (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2017) [hereinafter City of Lansing Complaint];
Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded & Endorsed Hereon ¶¶ 171-208, at 51-60,
Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-CV-508JHM-CHL (W.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Louisville/Jefferson County Complaint]; New
Mexico Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 294-365, at 105-23; Ohio Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶
215-48, at 89-100; City of Seattle Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 241-71, at 89-97.
137. City of Lansing Complaint, supra note 136, ¶¶ 519-613, at 119-46.
138. See id. ¶ 530, at 121.
139. Id. TT 534-613, at 122-46.
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illegal channels."1 40 The second category was referred to as the marketing
enterprise in which opioid manufacturers and others "engaged in a
coordinated conspiracy to deceive the American public and the medical
profession about the efficacy and safety of opioids, including by minimizing
the addictive qualities of opioids."141
According to the complaint, each diversion enterprise was a vertical
chain, consisting of an opioid manufacturer, one or more distributors and one
or more retail sellers. 142 The purpose of the enterprise was "to maximize the
members' profits at all costs," and "to manufacture, encourage excessive
prescriptions, distribute, and sell as many addictive-and often deadly pills
as legally possible."1 43 The complaint declared that the defendants' conduct
constituted a pattern of racketeering.144 It concluded that "[t]he multiple acts
of racketeering activity . .. were related to each other, had a similar purpose,
involved the same or similar participants and methods of commission, and
have similar results affecting similar victims,
45

. .

. [all of which] constitute[ed]

a 'pattern of racketeering activity."'1
The complaint also identified a number of predicate acts, which it
declared "constituted a variety of unlawful activities, each conducted with the
common purpose of obtaining significant monies and revenues while
benefitting from, encouraging, indirectly creating, contributing to, and
maintaining an illegal secondary market for highly addictive and dangerous
drugs."1 46 The complaint added that these predicate acts "involved the same
or similar purposes participants, victims, criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of commission, and
are not isolated events."1 47 More specifically, the complaint charged the
defendants with intentionally providing false information to the DEA about
suspicious orders and omitting material information from documents required
to be filed with the DEA.1 48 To support this allegation, the complaint
identified various show cause orders, fines, and settlement agreements
between the DEA and the distributor defendants for failure to maintain
effective control against the diversion of controlled substances.1 49

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. ¶ 534, at 122-23.
Id. ¶ 574, at 135.
Id. ¶ 539, at 124.
Id ¶ 540, at 124.
Id. ¶ 555, at 128.
Id
Id. ¶ 566, at 132.
Id
Id. ¶ 570, at 133.
Id TT 571-73, at 133-35.
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According to the City of Lansing's complaint, the opioid manufacturers
and others also created a marketing enterprise which involved a coordinated
conspiracy to deceive the American public and the medical profession about
the efficacy and safety of opioids.1o According to the complaint, this
arrangement qualified as a RICO enterprise because it "existed separate and
apart from defendants' racketeering acts and their conspiracy to commit such
acts." ' 5 More specifically, "[i]t has a consensual decision making structure
that is used to coordinate strategy, manipulate scientific data, suppress the
truth about the addictive qualities of opioids, and otherwise further the
Manufacturer defendants' fraudulent unified scheme."1 52 According to the
complaint, each of the defendants, acting in concert with other defendants,
"created and maintained systematic links for a common purpose," namely to
market opioids for the treatment of moderate pain and to suppress evidence
that they were harmful or ineffective for that purpose.1 53
In addition, the complaint alleged that the marketing enterprise engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity.1 54 According to the complaint, examples
of this pattern of racketeering activity included the formation of front groups
or the infiltration of existing professional organizations and trade associations,
such as the American Pain Foundation, the American Academy of Pain
Management, the American Pain Society, Federation of State Medical Boards
(FSMB), the Pain Care Forum, and the Healthcare Distribution Alliance, in
order to avoid regulation by the DEA. 5 5 The enterprise also recruited
physicians and other opinion leaders to promote the use of opioids.1 56
According to the complaint, these linkages between opioid manufacturers,
doctors, professional organizations, and other marketing participants were
established to achieve a common purpose, namely to market opioids to treat
all levels of pain.15 7 In addition, many participants in the enterprise received
substantial revenues from the scheme to increase the use of opioids. 158
Furthermore, the complaint stated that the marketing enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce or their activities affected interstate commerce.159

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶ 574, at 135.
¶ 576, at 136.
¶ 582, at 137.
¶ 584, at 138.
¶ 584(a)-(f), at 138-39.
¶ 586, at 140.
¶ 588, at 140-41.
¶ 588, at 141.
590, at 141.
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The complaint also identified various predicate acts of racketeering in
connection with the marketing enterprise.1 60 These included mail fraud and
wire fraud.161 Examples cited by the complaint involved false and misleading
communications to regulatory agencies and the public, sales and marketing
materials publications for doctors and patients, statements by front groups that
promoted opioids, guidelines issued by professional organizations that
recommended the use of opioids to treat chronic pain, and books and articles
sponsored by opioid manufacturers that assured doctors that opioids could be
safely prescribed for such purposes.1 62 Finally, the complaint alleged that the
City of Lansing sustained damages as the result of the conduct of the diversion
and marketing enterprises,163 and that these damages were neither derivative
nor remote. 164
It should be noted that defendants' marketing conduct was quite similar
to that of Pfizer in the Neurontin case. The City of Lansing complaint
identifies conduct that suggests that the opioid manufacturers are RICO
persons, that they created a RICO enterprise for the purpose of misleading the
public and the medical profession, that they engaged in predicate acts of
racketeering activity which affected interstate commerce, and as a result,
caused harm to the plaintiff.
D.

Unjust Enrichment and Restitution Claims

The principle of unjust enrichment enables a person to recover from
another when he has received a benefit and when it would be unjust for him
to retain the benefit, as for example when the defendant has obtained
possession or title to the plaintiff s property by fraud or by mistake.1 65 In order
to recover on such a claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a
benefit conferred upon the defendant by him; (2) that the defendant was aware
of the benefit; and (3) that the defendant has accepted the benefit under
circumstances where it would be inequitable to allow him to retain the benefit
without paying for it.1 66 It is important to note that unjust enrichment is

concerned with restitution

that is, it forces the defendant to disgorge

160. Id. TT 592-93, at 141-43.
161. Id. ¶ 592, at 141.
162. Id. ¶ 593, at 142-43.
163. Id. 611, at 146.
164. Id. ¶ 612, at 146.
165. Merchants Mut. Ins. v. Newport Hosp., 272 A.2d 329, 332 (R.I. 1971) (citing Seekins
v. King, 17 A.2d 869, 871 (R.I. 1941)).
166. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Anthony Corrado, Inc. v.
Menard & Co. Bldg. Contractors, 589 A.2d 1201, 1201-02 (R.I. 1991)).
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improperly retained benefits rather than compensating the plaintiff for any
harm done to him.1 67

In the past, private plaintiffs and government entities have sued product
manufacturers, seeking disgorgement of gains resulting from not paying for
the harm caused by the sale of dangerous products.1 68 For example, several
school districts brought successful unjust enrichment claims against asbestos
manufacturers to recover the cost of removing asbestos products from school
property.1 69 In addition, a number of states sought restitution from tobacco
companies for the health costs of smoking.17 0 However, since a "global
settlement" was reached before these cases could be tried, there is no way to
know whether the states' restitution claims would have been successful. 11
Other unjust enrichment cases against tobacco manufacturers produced
mixed results.1 72 For example, in City of St. Louis v. American Tobacco
Co.,1 73 the trial court agreed that St. Louis had stated a valid claim according

to the First Restatement of Restitution for the reimbursement of smokingrelated health care costs incurred by indigent residents. 174 On the other hand,
in Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris,175 a federal appeals court

&

rejected an unjust enrichment claim by a charitable hospital. 176 Unjust
enrichment suits were also filed against gun manufacturers by state and local
governments as well as by individuals.' 7 7 For example, in White v. Smith
7
Wesson Corporation,1
1 the Mayor of Cleveland alleged that the city had
conferred a benefit on the defendant gun manufacturer by incurring the costs
of harm incurred as the result of the manufacturer's negligent marketing

167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a

(2011).
168. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Restitution in Public Concern Cases, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 901, 913 (2003).
169. See generally, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 788 F. Supp.
1173 (D. Kan. 1992); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D.
Minn. 1990).
170. See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 849 (1999).
171. See Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency and Motive in Mass Restitution
Litigation, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2177, 2180 (2004).
172. Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 168, at 917-21.
173. 70 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
174. Id. at 1016-17 (applying the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 115 (1937)).
175. 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 446-48.
177. Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 168, at 917-20.
178. 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
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practices and its failure to incorporate certain safety features in its products. 179

'

The trial court refused to dismiss the plaintiff s claim.
More recently, unjust enrichment has also played a role in lead paint
litigation. In State v. Lead Industries, Association, the State of Rhode Island
argued that the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched because health care
and abatement costs paid by the government conferred a benefit on the
defendants by enabling them to profit from the sale of lead-based paint
without having to bear any of the costs.'I The defendants sought to dismiss
the case, but the trial court refused, declaring that it was not yet possible for it
to determine whether the State's expenditures had either enriched the
defendants or saved them from sustaining a loss.18 2

City of New York v. Lead Industries Association provides additional
support for the plaintiffs.' 83 In that case, the trial court dismissed the City's
unjust enrichment claim, but its decision was reversed on appeal. 184 The
appellate court concluded that "in undertaking such expenditures plaintiffs
discharged a duty which, although imposed upon plaintiffs by statutes and
regulation, should properly have been borne by the defendants who were
."15
responsible for having created this danger to public health and safety . ...
Although a number of unjust enrichment claims have been brought
against opioid sellers, many of them have provided little detail or analysis.
For example, the City of Everett's complaint declares that the defendant failed
to exercise effective controls against the diversion of its products, and as a
result was unjustly enriched at the plaintiffs expense. 8 6 The Lackawanna
County complaint was more specific, stating that the defendants'
"wrongdoing directly caused the Plaintiff to suffer increased expenditure on
public healthcare services, law enforcement, the justice system, child and
family services as well as lost productivity and lost tax revenue without
receiving any of the purported benefits deceptively promoted by
Defendants." 8

7

Other complaints have sought to recover for ineffective or unnecessary
drug treatments. For example, the New Hampshire complaint recited that by
deceptively and illegally marketing opioid products to treat chronic pain,

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 829.
Id.
No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830 at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2001).
Id. at *15.
See generally 222 A.D.2d 119 (1996).
Id. at 130-3 1.
Id. at 124.

186. City of Everett Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 97, at 22.
187. Lackawanna Complaint, supra note 92, T 288, at 77.
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Purdue induced health care providers to prescribe them for this purpose,
thereby causing the state to reimburse them for prescriptions that should never
have been written.'
According to the complaint, "Purdue has reaped
revenues and profits from the State's payments, enriching itself at the State's
expense, even as the State continues to cope with a crisis of opioid addiction,
overdose injury, and death that Purdue helped create." 8 9
In addition, the Navajo Nation sought to recover against distributors and
pharmacies rather than manufacturers.1 90 In that case, the complaint alleged
that the plaintiff had "conferred a benefit upon Distributor Defendants and
Pharmacy Defendants by paying for what may be called Distributor
Defendants' and Pharmacy Defendants' externalities-the costs of the harm
caused by Distributor Defendants' and Pharmacy Defendants' improper sales,
distribution, and dispensing practices."19' The problem with this reasoning, is
that it assumes that the defendants could have been legally compelled to pay
for the costs that the Navajo Nation incurred in responding to the opioid
epidemic. Otherwise, these costs would not be externalities that could be
characterized as a cost of business that the defendants shifted to the plaintiff.
E.

Civil Conspiracy Claims

A civil conspiracy claim requires: (1) an agreement to commit an
unlawful act or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means; (2) the commission
of an overt act in order to promote the conspiracy; (3) causation; and (4)
damagesto another resulting from the conspiracy.1 92 A civil conspiracy claim
can be very useful for plaintiffs because, if it succeeds, each member of the
conspiracy is treated as a joint tortfeasor, which reduces causation and proof
of damage problems for the plaintiffs because the acts of one defendant is
imputed to other members of the conspiracy.193
In the past, civil conspiracy claims were brought against the sellers of
cigarettes, asbestos, lead-based paint, and other products.1 94 For example, in

188. New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 270, at 90.
189. Id. ¶ 271, at 90-91.
190. Navajo Nation Complaint, supra note 98, ¶T 310-16, at 77-78.
191. Id. T 313, at 77.
192. See In re N.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (D.N.D.
1990) (citation omitted); Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 566 (Wis. 2005);
City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
193. See Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, The Needfor RationalBoundaries in
Civil Conspiracy Claims, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 37, 38 (2010).
194. Richard Ausness, Conspiracy Theories: Is There a Placefor Civil Conspiracy in
ProductsLiability Litigation?, 74 TENN. L. REV. 383, 396 (2007).
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United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.,1 95 the Justice Department alleged that
corporate officers from various tobacco companies met in 1953 to develop a
plan to rebut claims that smoking was a health hazard.1 96 Consequently, the
court ruled that the numerous misstatements and acts of concealment alleged
in the complaint indicated that they were made as "part of a far-ranging, multifaceted, sophisticated conspiracy" which was sufficient to state a RICO
violation claim.1 97

Plaintiffs also alleged that asbestos companies conspired to conceal the
health risks of asbestos from the medical profession and the public. Corporate
officers attended a meeting in 1936 and agreed to finance research at the
Trudeau Foundation's Saranac Laboratory in order to accumulate data to
defend against potential lawsuits.1 98 In response, a federal court ruled that the
plaintiffs had made aprimafacieshowing that the asbestos industry, including
its trade association and a Canadian company, had engaged in a conspiracy to
suppress information about the health risks of exposure to asbestos.1 99
Government plaintiffs have also brought civil conspiracy claims against
the manufacturers of lead-based paint.200 It was alleged that the executives
from the lead pigment industry established a trade association in 1928 known
as the Lead Industries Association and agreed to adopt a common strategy
regarding lead-based paints. 20' Furthermore, between 1930 and 1945, the lead
paint industry encouraged the use of lead paint even though it knew of the
health risks associated with this product.202 The City of Milwaukee was more
successful in its lawsuit against the lead paint industry. 203 In that case, the
lower court dismissed the conspiracy claim because it found that there was no
underlying tort upon which a conspiracy claim could be based. 204 However,
the appeals court cited a letter from one of the defendants, along with
documentation of the other defendant's involvement in the promotion of leadbased paint and its opposition to proposed federal regulatory legislation, to

195. 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000).
196. Id. at 136.
197. Id. at 149.
198. See Ronald L. Motley & Anne McGuinness Kearse, Decades of Deception: Secrets
ofLead, Asbestos, and Tobacco, TRIAL, Oct. 1, 1999 at 46, 47.
199. See In re N.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1096-97
(D.N.D. 1990).
200. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 487 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n,
951 A.2d 428, 440 (R.I. 2008).
201. See Motley & Kearse, supra note 198, at 46, 47.
202. See Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 552 (1st Cir. 1993); Brenner v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 288 A.D.2d 869, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
203. See generally City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
204. Id. at 895.
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conclude that there is sufficient evidence of their participation on the alleged
conspiracy to preclude summary judgment.205
Although several of the government plaintiffs in the opioid litigation have
included claims of civil conspiracy in their complaints, each allegation is
somewhat different. For example, in the City of Chicago's case, the complaint
alleged that the defendants "conspired to defraud the City while illegally and
deceptively promoting opioids in an effort to further opioid sales." 206 As a
result of these efforts, the City paid $9.5 million to reimburse third parties for
some 400,000 opioid prescriptions.

207

On the other hand, the Cherokee Nation's complaint alleged the existence
of a conspiracy between distributors and retail sellers of opioids. 208 According
to the complaint, the distributors continuously supplied prescription opioids
to the defendant pharmacies knowing that they were continuously violating
the Controlled Substances Act's monitoring and reporting requirements. 209
This tacit arrangement between distributors and retail sellers enabled both to
profit from the illegal sale of opioid products. 210
It remains to be seen whether the government plaintiffs can prove the
existence of an agreement, an overt act, causation, and damages in these cases.
In the case of the opioid manufacturers, the overt act requirement can be
satisfied by the various acts of misrepresentation and concealment about the
risks of using of opioids to treat chronic pain. As far as distributors and retail
sellers are concerned, the overt acts would involve violations of the Controlled
Substances Act, specifically selling opioids to suspicious parties, and failing
to monitor and report suspicious purchases to the DEA. The causation
requirement may be satisfied by showing that the opioid addiction problem
was directly caused by the manufacturers' misrepresentations to prescribers,
as well as the marketing and sale of excessive quantities of opioid drugs by
manufacturers, distributors, and retail pharmacies. Damages to the
government plaintiffs would include the cost of treating addiction, the cost of
law enforcement, and the intangible costs arising from the degrading of the
quality of life within the respective jurisdictions.
The agreement requirement will probably present the greatest problem for
government plaintiffs. Unlike the case with tobacco and asbestos companies,
where there was ample evidence of explicit agreements between the

205. Id. at 896.
206. City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 332, at 111. The trial court subsequently
dismissed the City's conspiracy complaint and the City abandoned it.
207. Id. ¶ 343, at 113.
208. See Cherokee Nation Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 222, at 50.
209. Id. 218, at 50.
210. Id. 221, at 50.
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defendants, so far little direct evidence of such agreements among opioid
sellers has emerged. However, there were some instances of joint funding by
opioid manufacturers of front groups and other activities that might provide
proof of an underlying agreement to mislead prescribers and potential
patients. In addition, it is possible that the plaintiffs will find a "smoking gun"
during the discovery process. Therefore, although allegations of civil
conspiracy have not been particularly successful in the case of other products,
they may fare better in the upcoming opioid litigation.
III. PRINCIPLES THAT POTENTIALLY LIMIT LIABILITY

Even if government plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of a particular
liability theory, the defendants are sure to invoke defenses and other legal
doctrines that potentially limit liability. First of all, lawsuits must be brought
within the statute of limitations period. In addition, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant actually caused the injury in question and, where multiple
actors are involved, must generally identify the damages that were caused by
each defendant. Furthermore, principles of proximate cause, duty, and shifting
responsibility may prevent the plaintiffs from recovering. Also, there are a
number of specialized doctrines, such as the economic loss rule, that may
affect a plaintiffs ability to recover in tort. Finally, defendants may invoke
the regulatory compliance defense and the scienter requirement.
A.

Statute ofLimitations

It is self-evident that a claim must be brought within the period specified
by the applicable statute of limitations. Generally speaking, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff s claim first accrues. 21' Tort claims
2 12
typically accrue when the plaintiff suffers some form of actual harm;
however, this rule is subject to a number of exceptions. The first is known as
the discovery rule, which provides that the limitations period will not begin to
run until the plaintiff discovers-or with the exercise of reasonable care
should have discovered that he or she has been injured by a particular
defendant. 213 The limitations period will also be tolled if the defendant

211. See City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Cal. 1975)).
212. Id.
213. See City of Manchester v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.R.I. 1986)
(citing Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.N.H. 1984)).
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fraudulently conceals the plaintiffs injury.2 14 Finally, the statute of
limitations will not completely bar recovery for a continuing nuisance,
although damages will be limited to those which occurred within the
limitations period.2 15 It should also be noted that statutes of limitation do not
run against the state or against local government entities when they are
exercising governmental functions as an arm of the state. 216
In the past, asbestos and lead-based paint manufacturers successfully
argued that the passage of the limitations period barred claims against them
based on negligence, 217 fraud, 218 and violation of unfair trade practice

statutes.219 Although these cases involved damage to real property rather than
economic losses to a government plaintiff, they suggest that statutes of
limitation may be a powerful tool for defendants in opioid litigation as well.
Moreover, because the limitations periods depend on the cause-of-action
involved, and also vary from state to state, they could greatly complicate
matters in consolidated proceedings such as multidistrict litigation, which
involve statutes of limitation from numerous states.
B.

Cause-in-Fact

The traditional test for cause-in-fact is the "but for" or sine qua non test,
which asks whether the injury would have occurred in the absence of the
defendant's conduct. 220 However, some states have adopted the substantial
factor test, particularly when multiple causes have contributed to the
plaintiffs injuries. 221 Under this approach, the causation requirement is

214. See Hooksett, 617 F. Supp. at 129 (D.N.H. 1984) (citing EIMCO-BSP Serv. Co. v.
Davison Constr. Co., 547 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.N.H. 1982)).
215. See Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992).
216. See Johnson Cty. ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 288
(E.D. Tenn. 1984) (citing Jennings v. Davidson County, 344 S.W.2d359, 361-62 (Tenn. 1961)).
217. See id. at 288; DetroitBd. ofEduc., 493 N.W.2d at 520.
218. See Johnson Cty., 580 F. Supp. at 288; City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 1994).
219. See City of Manchester v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 655-56 (D.R.I.
1986).
220. See Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004) (citing Lee v. Chi.
Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 502 (Ill. 1992)).
221. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 543 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017); City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1133 (Ill. 2004); Young, 821
N.E.2d at 1086 (citing Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 502 (Ill. 1992)); City of St.
Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
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satisfied if a defendant's act is a "substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff s
injury. 222

Regardless of which test of causation is used, the plaintiff must identify
the actual defendant who caused the harm. For example, in City of St. Louis
v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 223 although the plaintiff identified the residences

in which it had incurred costs in removing asbestos, it was unable to identify
any of the manufacturers whose paint had to be removed in any particular
residence. 224 Consequently, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. 225
On appeal, the court held the City's claim was properly dismissed because it
could not identify the specific defendant who had caused the harm in each
particular case.226
However, other courts have taken a more relaxed view of the causation
requirement. For example, in City of Chicago v. Beretta USA. Corp., the
court held that the City had shown that the defendant handgun dealers'
marketing practices caused the public nuisance described in the City's
complaint. 227 The court observed that the complaint contained "detailed
allegations regarding the dealer defendants' participation in bringing about
the alleged nuisance, specifically their conduct leading up to and at the point
of sale." 228 The court apparently felt that the City should not have the
impossible burden of identifying which gun dealer's products caused which
specific gun-related costs that the City incurred.
The court in People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. also applied a
more liberal test of causation.229 In that case, the State of California brought
a public nuisance action against two lead-based paint manufacturers and a
retail seller of these products. 23 0 The trial court ordered the defendants to pay
$1.15 billion into a fund to pay for the State's lead-based paint abatement
program.231 On appeal, the defendants argued that the State had failed to prove
that their promotion of lead-based paint was a substantial factor in causing the

222. J.T. Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 370 S.C. 362, 369, 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2006)
(citing Childers v. Gas Lines, Inc., 248 S.C. 316, 325, 149 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1966)).
223. 226 S.W.3d 110.
224. Id. at 113.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 116-17.
227. 821 N.E.2d at 1132.
228. Id.
229. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Ct. App. 2017).
230. Id. at 514.
231. Id.
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alleged nuisance.232 However, the appellate court concluded that "at least
some of those who were targets of these recommendations heeded them." 233
Proving causation could be difficult for government plaintiffs in cases
where they seek damages for generalized costs such as law enforcement,
emergency treatment, and degradation of the quality of life within their
territory where multiple defendants are involved. To make matters worse,
many of these costs are not solely attributable to opioid use but are also caused
by street drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines. Government
plaintiffs would almost certainly lose if they had to show how much of these
costs were caused by each opioid seller. A similar cost identification problem
could arise where statutory violations are alleged. Since these claims are based
on payments made by consumers or government entities for ineffective opioid
products, the government plaintiffs would presumably have to show in each
case whether the treatments were effective or not.
C. Duty
In most states, there is normally no duty to take measures to protect
another from harm.234 However, there are a number of exceptions to this "no
duty" rule. For example, a duty to act may arise: (1) when there is a special
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) when the defendant
voluntarily assumes a duty to act on the plaintiffs behalf; and (3) when the
defendant is subject to a duty imposed by law. 235 Several courts have relied
on a "no duty" analysis to relieve product sellers from liability for damages
caused by their products. 236 Thus, in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
the City of Chicago and Cook County bought a public nuisance action against
various manufacturers, distributors, and retail sellers of handguns, including
retail sellers who were located outside of the jurisdiction. 237 To determine
whether a duty existed, the court considered four factors: (1) the reasonable
foreseeability of the injury; (2) the likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude
of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of

232. Id. at 543.
233. Id. at 544.
234. See Burnett v. Family Kingdom, Inc., 387 S.C. 183, 190, 691 S.E.2d 170, 174 (Ct.
App. 2010).
235. See Wells v. City of Lynchburg, 331 S.C. 296, 307, 501 S.E. 2d 746, 752 (Ct. App.
1998).
236. See City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1126 (Ill. 2004); Young
v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d
1293, 1296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D. 2d 91, 102 (App. Div.
2003); see also Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 670 (8th Cir. 2009).
237. 821 N.E.2d at 1105-06.
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placing that burden on the defendant.238 Applying these factors, the court held
that the defendants owed no duty to protect the public at large against gun
violence.239
In some cases, plaintiffs have argued that marketing and promotional
activities can give rise to a special relationship which imposes a duty to inform
the public about the risks of its products. However, this view was rejected by
a federal appeals court in Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris. 240 In that case, seven union health and welfare funds sued a

number of tobacco manufacturers and trade associations to recover for the
costs of treating their members for smoking-related illnesses. 24' The plaintiffs
contended that the defendants' assurances about the safety of their products
constituted an undertaking which required them to exercise due care. 242
However, the appeals court rejected that argument, declaring that:
[c]onverting a company's marketing into a special undertaking to
inform the public about the known risks of its products would subject
every manufacturer that advertises its products to liability for a
"special duty" created by such marketing, and that duty would be
violated by every material omission in such advertising. We are
unwilling to so dramatically extend the scope of liability for a state243
law cause of action.

One would expect government plaintiffs to argue that the Controlled
Substances Act and other statutes impose a duty on the defendants to avoid
making false claims to doctors and patients and to monitor the actions of
distributors and retail sellers. However, the defendants will no doubt respond
that these statutes are concerned with protecting the physical welfare of
patients and do not give rise to a duty to protect the economic interests of state
and local governments.

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 1125 (citing Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insur., 804 N.E.2d 519, 529 (Ill. 2004)).
Id. at 1126.
171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 935-36.
Id. at 936.
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D. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause, sometimes referred to as "legal cause," 244 reflects the
principle that some outer limit should be set to the imposition of liability for
the consequences of an act, even a negligent one.245 Determining whether the
defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury often
involves the question of foreseeability that is, "whether the injury is of a
type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his conduct." 246
In addition, proximate cause is often invoked to cut off liability when other
causes have intervened between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
harm. Acts or events of this nature are often referred to as superseding causes
and include intervening criminal acts. 247
Some courts distinguish between a situation where the defendant's
conduct merely furnishes a condition by which an injury is made possible, and
a third person, acting independently, subsequently causes the injury. 248 in
such cases, the creation of the condition by the defendant is not considered to
be the proximate cause of the injury. 249 Several courts have relied on this
condition-versus-cause analysis to conclude that a defendant's conduct was
not a cause of the plaintiffs injury. 250 For example, in Ashley County,
Arkansas v. Pfizer, Inc., 251 twenty Arkansas counties accused a number of
drug companies of distributing over-the-counter cold medicines containing
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine knowing that these products would be used
by criminals to produce methamphetamine. 252 When the lower court
dismissed the plaintiffs' public nuisance and unjust enrichment claims, the
plaintiffs appealed, but a federal appellate court upheld the lower court's
ruling. 253 The appellate court agreed that the defendants' sale of cold medicine
did not proximately cause the counties to incur increased costs for government
services, declaring that:

244. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 545 (Ct. App.
2017).
245. See id at 545; City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1127 (Ill. 2004);
People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D.2d 91, 103-04 (App. Div. 2003).
246. See Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1086 (Ill. 2004) (citing Lee v. Chi.
Transit Authority, 605 N.E.2d 493, 503); see also State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 451
(R.I. 2008).
247. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 44, at 313.
248. See First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ill. 1999).
249. Id.
250. See Young, 821 N.E.2d at 1087; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 451.
251. 552 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2009).
252. Id. at 662.
253. Id. at 670.
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[t]he criminal actions of the methamphetamine cooks and those
further down the illegal line of manufacturing and distributing
methamphetamine are 'sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury'
to the Counties in the form of increased government services, and
they are 'totally independent' of the Defendants' actions of selling
cold medicines to retail stores, even if the manufacturers knew that
cooks purchased their products to use in manufacturing
methamphetamine .254
A New York intermediate appellate court reached a similar conclusion in
People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. 255 That case involved a public nuisance

action by the State of New York against various handgun manufacturers,
distributors, and retail sellers. 256 The lower court dismissed the public
nuisance claim and the State appealed.257 However, the appeals court affirmed
the lower court's ruling and concluded that the connection between the
defendants, criminal wrongdoers, and the plaintiff was too attenuated to
satisfy the proximate cause requirement. 258 Courts have also ruled against
health care providers and unions on proximate cause grounds when they have
sought to recover against product sellers for costs associated with the
treatment of product-related injuries or diseases. 259
However, in People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., another court
recently concluded that the plaintiff had shown that the defendants' marketing
practices proximately caused a public nuisance. 260 In that case, the State of
California sued manufacturers and sellers of lead-based paint for allegedly
creating a public nuisance in the State. 26 1 On appeal, the defendants
maintained that their promotion and marketing efforts were too removed from
the current public nuisance to be a proximate cause. 262 instead, they argued
that due to the passage of time, the damage to the state from lead-based paint
was "more closely attributable to owner neglect, renovations, painters,

254. Id at 670; see also Indep. Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889 (E.D. Ark.
2008).
255. 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 200 (App. Div. 2003).
256. Id. at 194.
257. Id
258. See id. at 202.
259. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2000) (public
nuisance and civil conspiracy); Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (RICO and antitrust); Ark. Carpenters' Health
& Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936, 943-44 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
260. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 545 (Ct. App. 2017).
261. Id. at 514.
262. Id. at 545.
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architects, and repainting." 263 However, the appeals court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the plaintiff had met the proximate cause requirement. 264
According to the court:
[t]he connection between the long-ago promotions and the current
presence of lead paint was not particularly attenuated. Those who
were influenced by the promotions to use lead paint on residential
interiors in the 10 jurisdictions were the single conduit between the
defendants' actions and the current hazard. Under these
circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that
the defendants' promotions, which were a substantial factor in
creating the current hazard, were not too remote to be considered a
legal cause of the current hazard even if the actions of others in
response to those promotions and the passive neglect of owners also
played a causal role. 265

It remains to be seen whether the ConAgra court's view of proximate
cause is an outlier, or whether it represents the beginning of a more expansive
treatment of this issue by courts in the future.
E.

Shifting Responsibility

The principle of shifting responsibility provides that a defendant may
escape liability if it can show that it reasonably relied on other parties to take
adequate precautions to protect the plaintiff from harm. Both drug
manufacturers and distributors might invoke the shifting responsibility
doctrine as a defense, essentially seeking to blame other members of the chain
of distribution for failing to take effective measures to prevent widespread
misuse of their products. According to this argument, once manufacturers
delivered their products to distributors, they no longer had legal or physical
control over them and could reasonably assume that downstream sellers
would take measures to prevent diversion as they were required to do under
the CSA. However, government plaintiffs would point out that this argument
is weakened by the fact that opioid manufacturers were fully aware that their
products were being distributed in quantities that far exceeded legitimate
therapeutic needs.

263. Id.
264. Id. at 546.
265. Id.
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F. Restrictions on Damage Awards
Some states prohibit government entities from seeking damage awards
for future losses in public nuisance actions, and instead limit them to
injunctive relief. 266 In addition, there are two other doctrines that could cause
trouble for government plaintiffs. The first is known as the economic loss rule
and the second is referred to as the free public services or municipal cost
recovery doctrine.
1.

The Economic Loss Rule

The economic loss rule prevents plaintiffs from recovering in negligence
or strict liability cases when they suffer only economic losses, as opposed to
personal injuries or property damage. 267 A defendant asbestos manufacturer
successfully invoked the economic loss doctrine in Adams-Arapahoe School
District No. 28-J. 268 In that case, a federal appeals court concluded that the

plaintiff school board had failed to prove that asbestos in vinyl asbestos tile
installed in its schools had contaminated the school buildings, and rejected its
claim that the threat of future harm was sufficient to allow it to recover the
cost of removal. 269 However, most other courts have ruled that asbestos
removal costs should not be treated as purely economic losses.270
On the other hand, an Illinois court held the economic loss doctrine to be
applicable in a public nuisance action against handgun manufacturers,
distributors, and dealers in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation.271
In that case, the City sought to recover for "the costs of emergency medical
services, law enforcement efforts, the prosecution of violations of gun control
ordinances, and other related expenses." 272 Cook County also sought to
recover for similar costs. 273

The plaintiffs contended that the damages that they incurred were not the
product of "disappointed commercial expectations" such as "damages for
inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or

266. See Gifford, supra note 60, at 872.
267. See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liabilityfor Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REV.
505, 523 (1994); Catherine M. Sharkey, In Search of the Cheapest Cost Avoider: Another View
of the Economic Loss Rule, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (2017).
268. 959 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
269. Id. at 874.
270. See, e.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 919-20 (8th Cir.
1993); City of Manchester v. Nat'1 Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (R.I. 1986).
271. 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1143 (Ill. 2004).
272. Id. at 1106.
273. Id.
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consequent loss of profits."274 Instead, the court concluded that the true
purpose of the economic loss doctrine was to prevent plaintiffs from relying
on tort law in order to recover for speculative or unlimited damages. 275
Accordingly, the court held that the damages sought were solely economic in
nature "in the sense that they represent costs incurred in the absence of harm
276
to a plaintiff's person or property."

Although government plaintiffs in the current opioid litigation may argue
that the economic loss doctrine should not be applied to their claims, it appears
that the facts in the opioid cases are distinguishable from the asbestos cases.
In the asbestos cases, the plaintiffs sought to recover for the costs of removing
highly dangerous material from their property. In contrast, the plaintiffs in the
opioid cases do not own any property that is directly affected by the
defendants' conduct. Rather, they are seeking reimbursement for costs that
they have incurred while performing governmental functions. The losses
involved in the opioid cases arguably resemble those involved in the City of
Chicago decision where the prospect of unlimited damages persuaded the
court to limit this type of liability.
2.

Municipal Cost Recovery Doctrine

The free public services or municipal cost recovery doctrine provides that
a government entity cannot sue a tortfeasor to recover the costs of public
services that were made necessary because of the defendant's negligence. 277
This doctrine has been adopted by a number of jurisdictions, though not a
majority, 27 and various rationales have been offered to support it.279 Perhaps
the most persuasive was that set forth by a federal appeals court in the City of
Flagstaffcase:
[w]here such services are provided by the government and the costs
are spread by taxes, the tortfeasor does not expect a demand for
reimbursement. This is so even though the tortfeasor is fully aware

274. Id. at 1139.
275. See id. at 1143.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 1143-44.
278. See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322,
323 (9th Cir. 1983); Cty. of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone All., 223 Cal. Rptr. 846, 859 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Town of Freetown v. New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997, 998
(Mass. 1981); Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 321 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Wis. 1982).
279. See Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of
Public Services from Tortfeasors?: Tort Subsidies, the Limits ofLoss Spreading, and the Free

Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REV. 727, 752-59 (2002).
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that private parties injured by its conduct, who cannot spread their
risk to the general public, will have a cause of action against it for
damages proximately or legally caused.280
At least one court has invoked the municipal cost recovery rule to prohibit
government entities from recovering damages against the manufacturers and
retail sellers of handguns. In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation,
the Illinois court applied the rule to prevent the City from recovering the costs
of law enforcement and emergency medical care that it claimed resulted from
illegal gun sales. 281 According to the court, "where a system already exists for

the rational allocation of costs, and where society as a whole relies upon that
system, there is little reason for a court to impose an entirely new system of
allocation." 28 2 Therefore, the court held that the City could not recover
monetary damages that were not directly related to the costs of abatement or
as compensation for damage to municipal property. 283
On the other hand, an Ohio court refused to apply the municipal cost
recovery doctrine in a similar case. In City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corporation,defendant gun manufacturers urged the court to reject the City's
damage claim, arguing that it was foreclosed by the municipal cost recovery
rule. 28 4 Although the court acknowledged that the City could not reasonably
expect to recover the costs for services a City incurs whenever a tortfeasor
causes harm, it concluded that the rule was primarily concerned with a "single,
discrete incident requiring a single emergency response," and would not
necessarily apply in a case where the alleged harm was "ongoing and
persistent," and that the continuing nature of the defendants' misconduct
justified the recoupment of the City's costs. 28 5 Other courts have also held that
the municipal cost recovery rule does not automatically bar all government
damage claims.286
The economic loss rule may also cause a problem for government
plaintiffs.287 Although the rule would not bar fraud claims or most statutory
claims, at least one court has extended it to public nuisance actions. 288 Finally,
the municipal cost recovery rule may also prevent government plaintiffs from

280. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d at 323.
281. See 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1147 (Ill. 2004).
282. Id. at 1145.
283. Id. at 1147.
284. 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1149 (Ohio 2002).
285. Id.
286. See City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1240 (Ind. 2003).
287. See Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. No. 28-J, 959 F.2d 868, 874 (10th Cir. 1992);
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1143.
288. See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1143.
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recovering from drug companies for the cost of providing certain public
services, such as emergency room treatment and law enforcement activities.
Since courts have split over whether the rule should be applied in cases
involving handguns, 28 9 it is likely that at least some courts will also apply it
to lawsuits against opioid sellers.
G. Regulatory Compliance and Scienter
Although the regulatory compliance defense and the scienter requirement
are relatively weak arguments, they should not be dismissed out of hand. As
we have seen, violation of a statute or safety regulation may cause the
defendant's conduct to be labeled as negligence per se. However, compliance
with a statute or regulation is usually only evidence of due care. Yet, a number
of states have enacted legislation that provides that warnings that have been
approved by the FDA are presumed to be adequate. Opioid manufacturers
may try to assert a regulatory compliance defense in those states since they
provided FDA-approved warnings about the risk of addiction on all of their
products. According to the defendants, they produced a useful pharmaceutical
drug, complied with all government regulations and should not be held
responsible for the misuse of their products by others. However, government
plaintiffs may respond that they did not necessarily claim that the defendants'
warnings were inadequate, but rather that they lied about the suitability of
opioid therapy for chronic pain and failure to properly control the distribution
of opioids for non-medical uses.
The overwhelming majority of courts apply a foresight test as far as
liability for product risks are concerned. 290 In other words, a plaintiff must
show that at the time of sale, the defendant had knowledge or scienter of the
risk that occurred. 29' Therefore, opioid producers can argue that while they
were aware of the risk of addiction (and warned about it), they could not have
foreseen that their products would be widely abused and would thereby cause
economic harm to the plaintiffs. In response, government plaintiffs will point
out that evidence of opioid addiction in many parts of the country was widely
publicized as early as 1998 and the defendants failed to change the marketing
practices that contributed to this problem.

289. Compare Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1147 (applying the municipal cost
recovery rule), with City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1149-50 (Ohio
2002) (refusing to apply the municipal cost recovery rule).
290. Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, in Symposium, Products
Liability: Litigation Trends on the 10th Anniversary of the Third Restatement, 26 REV. LITIG.
1067, 1080 (2007).
291. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 31, at 169-70.
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IV. CONCLUSION

This Article identified a number of liability theories that state and local
government plaintiffs have invoked in their lawsuits against the producers and
sellers of prescription opioids. These theories, some of which are more
persuasive than others, included public nuisance, negligence, fraudulent
misrepresentation, violation of statute, unjust enrichment, and civil
conspiracy. Public nuisance is the most popular of these liability theories, but
a number of states have limited such a theory to activities that take place on
land and a few refuse to allow government plaintiffs to recover damages.
Negligence claims are based on questionable marketing practices and the
failure to prevent these highly addictive products from falling into the hands
of drug abusers. Opioid manufacturers clearly misrepresented the safety and
effectiveness of their products to doctors, but fraudulent misrepresentation
claims are questionable because they were directed at doctors rather than state
or local governments officials.
Violation of statute might be a viable theory, especially those which
involve RICO or false claims. Other statutory violations are more
problematic, unless government plaintiffs can show they were designed to
protect their economic interests. Unjust enrichment appears to be a weak
theory, unless government plaintiffs can show that opioid producers and
sellers were wrongly enriched at their expense. Finally, if government
plaintiffs bring civil conspiracy claims against opioid manufacturers or
sellers, they will have to prove they agreed to commit tortious or illegal acts.
In addition to limitations in the liability theories identified above,
government plaintiffs will also have to contend with a host of other doctrines
that potentially limit liability. These include the statute of limitations, causein-fact, proximate cause, duty, and shifting responsibility. In addition,
defendants may rely upon certain specialized doctrines, such as the economic
loss rule and the municipal cost recovery rule, that prohibit the recovery for
purely economic losses. Finally, defendants may invoke the regulatory
compliance defense and the scienter requirement. All of this suggests that
there is no assurance that government plaintiffs will necessarily satisfy state
law requirements in every state.
Of course, the liability of opioid producers and sellers may not ultimately
be decided by jury trials. Other outcomes are possible, including bankruptcy,
settlement, or protracted case-by-case litigation. One possibility is that some
defendants, particularly smaller ones, will follow the lead of the asbestos
industry and seek refuge in bankruptcy protection. Under this approach, the
bankruptcy court may distribute some of the bankrupt company's assets to
government plaintiffs and create a trust fund from other assets to satisfy future
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claims. 292 Presumably, the size of these disbursements will depend on the
expected value of present and future claims. A second approach, which was
pursued by defendants in the handgun and lead-based paint litigation, would
be to take any and all cases to trial. Opioid defendants would not voluntarily
choose to follow this course unless they expected either to win most of these
cases or to settle them individually on attractive terms. However, they might
not have any choice if settlement negotiations broke down.
The third, and most likely, result would be a "global" settlement. Indeed,
a settlement of some sort will probably emerge out of the multidistrict
litigation proceeding currently underway in a federal district court in
Cleveland, Ohio. One would assume that such a settlement, if it occurs, will
resemble the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that was reached between
the states and the tobacco industry in 1998.293 In that case, the defendants
agreed to make annual payments to the states in perpetuity, with the value of
these payments estimated to be over $200 billion for the first twenty-five
years. 294 In addition to specifying the percentage of settlement funds that each
state would receive, the MSA imposed marketing and advertising restrictions
on the tobacco industry, as well as restrictions on lobbying and the targeting
of minors.295
What are the prospects for a similar global settlement in the opioid
litigation? First of all, the parties must regard settlement as an acceptable
option. Since the defendants appear to have requested that the lawsuits against
them be consolidated, they were presumably aware that the vast majority of

292. This technique was successfully used in the A.H. Robins (Dalkon Shield IUD)
bankruptcy proceeding. Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why and The
How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 111-17 (2004).
293. Another settlement of interest is the one reached in the Vioxx litigation. See generally
Jeremy T. Grabill, JudicialReview ofPrivate Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
123, 142-46 (2012). The case arose from the sale of Merck's pain-killing drug Vioxx between
1999 and 2004. The drug was taken off the market in 2004 after it was accused of causing heart
attacks and strokes. Eventually, more than 50,000 suits were filed against Merck in state and
federal courts. See Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Modelfor Resolving Complex Litigation If a
Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2213 (2008). In 2007, Merck's
representatives signed an agreement with the plaintiffs' law firms under which the
pharmaceutical company agreed to pay $4.85 billion to settle these claims. See Benjamin C.
Zipursky & Howard M. Erichson, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 266
(2011).
294. See Andrew J. Haile & Matthew W. Krueger-Andes, Landmark Settlements and
Unintended Consequences, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (2012). So far, these annual
payments have averaged between $7 billion and $9 billion. See Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big
Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement,
63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1099 (2010).
295. James J. White & Hanoch Dagan, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 373 (2000).
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MDL cases ultimately settle.296 There are reasons why a settlement might be
attractive to the defendants. For example, if a reasonable settlement could be
reached, it would save the defendants a considerable amount of money in
litigation expenses. A settlement would also reduce the chances of being
damaged by a "smoking gun" disclosure during one of the many trials that
would occur in the absence of a settlement. Finally, a settlement would bring
a measure of closure to the opioid controversy and allow the defendants to
move on.
One would also expect the plaintiffs to have an interest in reaching a
settlement. In the first place, the plaintiffs would start receiving their money
much sooner if they settled than if they took each case to trial. In addition, the
trial lawyers who financed these cases on a contingency fee basis would rather
be paid sooner than later. Moreover, the plaintiffs (and their lawyers) would
probably prefer to settle for a guaranteed sum of money rather than taking
their chances by going to trial. Finally, a settlement could impose
requirements on opioid sellers to regulate their marketing practices.
However, even if all of the parties agreed that a settlement was in their
best interests, there is no assurance that they could actually reach one. One
problem is for the parties to agree on the overall size of the proposed
settlement. In theory, this would require an evaluation of both liability and
damages for each claim. Unfortunately, as this Article has pointed out,
liability rules (including rules that limit liability) vary substantially from state
to state. In addition, calculating damages for each of these claims will require
extensive documentation. Although bellwether trials may provide some
information on these issues, it can be expected that the parties will find it
difficult to reach an agreement.
Furthermore, if the parties can eventually agree on an overall settlement
amount, each side will then have to determine how to apportion benefits and
liabilities. Here again, one would expect the relative strengths and weaknesses
of each party's case, as well as the damages suffered by each plaintiff, to be
relevant to resolving apportionment problems. At the present time, there are
more than a thousand government plaintiffs involved in opioid litigation. Not
every plaintiff has sued every defendant, nor has every plaintiff brought the
same claims. All of this will have to be sorted out by them. Another problem
is determining the amount of damages that each plaintiff has suffered.
Of course, the defendants have the same problem, though not on the same
scale. Excluding doctors and other individuals, there are three classes of
defendants: manufacturers, distributors, and retail sellers. For a settlement to
go forward, these defendants will have to agree on how much of the settlement

296. See Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 4, at 2329.
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costs each group will have to bear. Assuming that such an agreement is
possible, each group would have to agree on a formula to apportion
responsibility its share of the settlement among the individual defendants in
each category.
All of this suggests that the parties may not be able to reach a settlement,
even though it is in their best interests to do so. In some respects, this task
may be easier for the plaintiffs because settlement negotiations for them are
largely handled by lead counsel or a steering committee. If the plaintiffs'
lawyers can reach a global settlement with the defendants, they can exert
considerable pressure on their clients to agree to the settlement terms. 297
Although the parties may be able to reach a quick settlement, it is more likely
that this process will take a number of years.

297. Presumably, the defendants only care about their overall liability under the settlement
and will have no interest in how the settlement proceeds are distributed among the plaintiffs and
their lawyers.
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